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Understanding Perceptions and Attitudes to Risk in the 
Tourism Industry  
Volume 2(i), 2014 
Part 1: The Understanding of Risk  
The tourism industry is now the largest source of 
employment and foreign revenue for a number of 
countries, who have therefore become relatively 
dependent on the industry. This means that anything 
that makes people more or less likely to travel, or to 
choose one destination over another, or affects the rate 
of growth in the industry, tends to have immediate and 
relatively widespread consequences in these countries 
(Bailey, Clayton & Karagiannis, 2014 in press). This 
dependency has been highlighted by a number of 
disasters, including 9/11, the tsunami in South-East 
Asia, Hurricane Katrina, the SARS outbreak and 
others, which have exposed the extent to which tourism 
is vulnerable to diverse risks (Lepp & Gibson, 2003; 
Peattie, Clark & Peattie, 2005; Tsai & Chen, 2010; 
Park & Reisinger, 2010; Korstanje, 2009). 
There is now a great deal of interest in identifying and 
quantifying risk, but there has not yet been 
commensurate attention to the ways that people 
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An increasingly complex and rapidly-evolving array of risks presents one of the greatest 
challenges for decision-makers in all sectors, including the transport and tourism 
industry. The prospects of an international destination can be profoundly damaged in 
minutes as a result of a major outbreak of infectious disease, a natural disaster or a 
terrorist incident. It is therefore vital to understand the changing nature of risk and the 
ways that risks are perceived and understood, especially as people tend to respond to the 
perception of risks rather than actual risks, which means that their responses are not 
always rational and can even expose them to more danger. 
The first part of this paper assesses the understanding of risk, and why social, cultural 
and psychological factors influence the response to threat, the second part looks at the 
application of this approach to tourism, and the third part sets out a model that can 
capture the relevant variables for the tourism industry. 
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Figure 1 : Fear and Uncertainty 
https://highstreettothehills.wordpress.com/tag/fear/  
respond to perceived risk (Korstanje, 2013) with regard 
to the potential implications for particular industries. 
The former has led to algorithms that quantify 
investment risk, for example, but this has not 
adequately captured the elements of human psychology 
that can result in apparently irrational behaviour. This 
essay therefore focuses on the latter, utilising a model 
based on the conceptual desagregation of reason and 
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perception proposed by Sunstein (2002). With regard 
to the application to tourism, this model indicates that 
the long-term resilience and success of a tourist 
destination depends on (a) the exposure to risk, (b) the 
perception of risk and (c) the ability to manage both (a) 
and (b). Some destinations are more likely to be 
severely impacted by adverse events because they do 
not give sufficient attention to the need to both control 
risks and manage the perception of risk. In some cases, 
latent threats are ignored or trivialized, or external 
perspectives of risk rejected as intrusive or unfair, 
which can lead to disaster when threats eventually 
become real. 
There are also issues with regard to the limits to 
knowledge and certainty, and therefore to the extent to 
which some risks can be controlled, an idea which 
some people find threatening in itself. Denial, however, 
is rarely a wise option for decision-makers. 
Risk and uncertainty 
As the result of technological progress, economic 
development and political reform, people around the 
world are becoming healthier and living longer. It is 
important to note that almost all of this progress has 
been happened over the last century, which may have 
created a sense among the current generation that this 
kind of improvement is normal. In fact, this rate of 
improvement is not „normal‟, in that it is unique to this 
era, although there are many reasons for hoping and 
some reasons for believing that it may last for some 
time to come. 
In the time of the Roman Empire, average life 
expectancy for a Roman was about 20-25 years 
(Rosenberg, retrieved 2014). It took two thousand 
years (until 1900) for the global, average life 
expectancy to increase slightly to 30 years, a rate of 
improvement of less than 1 additional day of life per 
year. Life expectancy then doubled over the next 
century, a rate of improvement of about 110 days of 
additional life per year, which means that the rate of 
improvement suddenly increased over 100-fold. By 
2012 the world average life expectancy at birth was 70 
years (World Health Organization Global Health 
Observatory, retrieved 2014), and is approaching 90 in 
a few countries. This extraordinary surge in life 
expectancy was the result of improvements in 
agriculture and food supply systems, water and 
sanitation, medicine and health care, and increases in 
productivity which made it possible to generate enough 
wealth to support a far higher population. This means 
that people born today have a lower risk of premature 
death than any previous generation in history. 
However, there are now some serious potential 
problems that could disrupt this progress. For example, 
The Global Trends 2030 report by the US National 
Intelligence Council notes that world demand for food, 
water, and energy will grow by approximately 35%, 
40%, and 50% respectively by 2030, due to the 
increase in global population and rising per capita 
consumption, while climate change will create 
instability in many regions by contributing to water 
and food shortages (retrieved 2014). The combination 
of rising demand for food, energy, water and other 
resources, environmental degradation, climate change 
and the associated impacts on agricultural systems and 
livelihoods, in conjunction with poverty, 
unemployment, crime, corruption and failures of 
governance, could increase the incidence of violent 
conflicts in many regions in future if these problems 
are not resolved. 
So average exposure to risk has been falling for 
decades, but the possibility of a future increase in risk 
appears to be rising. This means that the quality of life 
available to the next generation may, unusually, be 
lower than today. 
There are several dimensions to this challenge that 
require further analysis. The degree of exposure to 
these risks varies between regions, nations and 
generations, as does the flow of benefits from the 
current status quo, and the fact that the risks are 
unequally distributed greatly complicates the search for 
solutions. For example, China is by far the world‟s 
largest carbon emitter, but the Government of China 
does not want to incur the risk of reduced rates of 
economic growth and of losing domestic support by 
imposing the additional cost of carbon reduction 
measures, so has effectively traded its immediate 
domestic political and economic risk against the long-
term damage that may be caused by climate change. 
There are also important differences in attitudes to 
uncertainty. For example, the World Bank Turn Down 
the Heat report (2012, retrieved 2014) notes that the 
world average surface temperature has now risen by 
almost 1C, that an increase of 3 or 3.5C by 2100 is 
now considered „probable‟, and that there may be 
„catastrophic consequences‟ if there is a 4C rise, with 
some parts of the world becoming effectively 
uninhabitable. However, there are also projections 
(from Bloomberg New Energy Finance, retrieved 
2014) indicating that fossil fuel use will peak by 2030 
as the result of the rapid displacement of fossil fuels 
with cheap, efficient solar cells, which would certainly 
avert some of the worst consequences of climate 
change.  
  
~ 49 ~ 
Clayton, Mustelier & Korstanje Understanding Perceptions and Attitudes to Risk 
  
  
Neither outcome is certain; they are both possible 
future scenarios. The former projection assumes that 
most energy will continue to be sourced from fossil 
fuels; the latter projection assumes technological 
substitution. Which projection proves to be more 
accurate will depend on many variables, including the 
rate of technological innovation and uptake, demand, 
and governmental intervention in the market place, 
amongst others. So the issue is whether indeterminacy 
is seen as a justification for more vigorous action (to 
avert the worst-case outcome) or inaction (as the 
problem will eventually resolve itself as a result of 
technological advances). The stance that individuals 
take with regard to uncertainties of this kind tends to 
depend on a range of psychological and cultural 
factors, including their optimism or pessimism about 
the future, and their beliefs, particularly with regard to 
factors such as the importance of freedom and whether 
there are limits to growth. 
In addition, as Clayton and Radcliffe (1996) note, each 
possible outcome is usually attended by a different 
distribution of risk, that is, by a different distribution of 
costs and benefits. This means that there are both 
technical and political considerations in any analysis of 
probability and risk. For example, a small risk of a 
major disaster (a 0.01% chance of an incident that 
would kill 10,000 people), and a larger risk of a smaller 
disaster (a 100% chance of an incident that would kill 
one person), give rise to the same expected outcome in 
terms of losses (1 statistical life), provided that the risk 
estimates are accurate. Despite this, the characteristics 
of the two outcomes are very different, and people are 
sensibly concerned about the distribution of such risks. 
There is no „correct‟ way of choosing between such 
risks; the crux of the debate is about the acceptability 
of particular distributions of risk. As these examples 
suggest, most debates about progress, development and 
the environment ultimately resolve into different 
perceptions and responses to risk, which are in turn 
influenced by cultural values (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1983). The relationship between culture, perception, 
risks and consequences is therefore the subject of this 
paper. 
The perception of risk 
The way that people perceive and respond to risk is 
partly culturally-mediated. For example, after the 9/11 
terrorist incident in 2001, many US citizens were more 
reluctant to fly, because they feared being the victims 
of the next terrorist incident. However, they did not 
stop travelling, but would drive rather than take a 
domestic flight. This is likely to have increased the 
death toll significantly, as flying is much safer than 
driving in terms of deaths/passenger/kilometre 
(Korstanje and Clayton, 2012). About 44,000 people 
die annually in car accidents in the USA, while about 
200 die in aircraft accidents (in fact, flying is safer than 
bathing, as some 325 US citizens drown in their bath 
each year). 
So, as a result of choosing to drive instead of flying, it 
is likely that about 1,595 additional people died in car 
accidents. As 2,976 people died during the 9/11 attack 
itself, the number of fatalities in the USA caused by 
9/11 is likely to have been increased by over 50% by 
the consequent deaths on the roads. As this example 
illustrates, sometimes the actions that people take in 
response to a perceived threat actually increase their 
exposure to risk, mainly because of the way that most 
people act on the basis of their beliefs and perceptions, 
rather than reality. 
Today, many US citizens still greatly over-estimate the 
threat of terrorism, and underestimate other risks; in 
particular, those associated with their lifestyles. As 
Zakaria (2013, retrieved 2014) notes, between 2001 
and 2013, foreign-inspired terrorism claimed about two 
dozen lives in the USA (an average of two per year). 
Over the same period, over 100,000 Americans were 
killed in gun homicides (about 8,340 per year), and 
over 400,000 were killed in motor-vehicle accidents 
(about 33,340 per year). These were minor threats, 
however, in comparison to physical inactivity and poor 
nutrition (diets high in sugar, fat and salt), which cause 
310,000-580,000 deaths in the USA every year, similar 
to the number of deaths caused by tobacco. So an 
overweight smoker with a bad diet is roughly half a 
million times more likely to die as a result of their 
lifestyle choices than as a result of terrorism, and yet 
may be far more worried that their next flight will be 
hijacked by terrorists. 
There are also people who live on the slopes of active 
volcanoes, on unstable slopes, in areas liable to 
flooding and in other hazardous areas, or work in 
dangerous occupations. Some of the people in these 
circumstances are not fully aware of the risks, some 
have fatalistic attitudes or religious faith to help them 
cope, and some are in denial. For example, when 
Mount Vesuvius erupted in AD 79 it destroyed two 
cities and killed about 16,000 people. It has erupted 
many times since then, most recently in 1944. Today, 
some three million people live on its lower slopes, 
mostly in the city of Naples, which lies just 9km west 
of the volcano. Some of them believe that the volcano 
will not erupt again in their lifetime, or that there will 
be sufficient warning for them to escape. For some, 
however, this may not be true. 
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The perceived fairness of balance between risk and 
reward is also a factor. For example, most people will 
rate a situation as being significantly more risky if their 
exposure to the risk is not voluntary, if children are 
exposed to the risk, or if the situation is not perceived 
as fair, that is, if the benefits accrue to one person and 
the risks to another. Clayton and Radcliffe (1996) note 
that many people in the USA rated their exposure to 
the agrochemical Alar, which was sprayed on apples, 
as being significantly more risky than drinking high-
roast coffee, even though both contain potential 
carcinogens and the latter activity is arguably the more 
dangerous. Exposure to Alar was widely perceived as a 
high risk partly because children were exposed to the 
risk, because the exposure was not undertaken 
knowingly or voluntarily, and because the benefits of 
spraying accrued to the producers and retailers while 
the consumers accrued the risks. In this case, the apples 
were slightly cheaper as a result of the use of Alar, but 
this was not seen as adequate compensation by the 
consumers concerned. 
The perception of control 
The perception of control is also a factor. In the 
example given earlier, people preferred to drive rather 
than fly because they felt that they were in control of 
their car, but would not be in control of a situation on 
board a hijacked aircraft. This perception of control is 
largely illusory, of course, as the safety of every driver 
depends on the alertness, competence and sobriety of 
other road users, and accidents involving tired or 
intoxicated drivers are far more common than terrorist 
incidents. 
As these examples suggest, the relationship between 
actual risk, the perception of risk and any consequent 
change in behaviour is influenced by a number of 
variables, including the level of understanding of the 
situation and of probabilities, personal attitude to risk 
and cultural factors. These variables largely determine 
which risks are recognized, and which are not, and 
which risks are magnified, and which are under-
estimated. Even awareness of risk does not always 
translate into risk-minimizing strategies; it can also 
result in belief systems that allow people to live with 
risk by creating a sense that the risk can be ignored or 
placated. So, perceptions can profoundly influence 
behaviour, life styles and expectations. It is clear, 
therefore, that social and psychological factors are 
highly important considerations when translating 
technical assessments of risk into terms of everyday 
language and experience, and when formulating 
procedures for controlling risks in the domain of public 
policy. 
The discrepancy between perception and reality of 
exposure to risk is relatively easy to understand with 
regard to individuals, but the same mismatch can also 
be true of institutional responses. For example, as 
Balko (2013) points out, civil disturbances of the 
1960s followed by the „war on drugs‟ led to the 
introduction of paramilitary tactics by police officers in 
the USA; partly to ensure their own safety and partly to 
protect the communities they serve. In the mid-1980s 
less than half of large cities in the USA (over 50,000 
population) and just 20% of small cities (below 50,000 
population) had Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) 
teams, but today it is has risen to almost 90% of the 
large cities and 80% of the small cities. The SWAT 
teams are also deployed far more frequently; SWAT 
teams were deployed in the USA about 3,000 times in 
1980, but are now used about 50,000 times each year. 
This is largely because they were previously reserved 
for situations where there was a high risk of violence, 
but they are now routinely used on many deployments 
where there is relatively little risk of resistance 
(including breaking up illegal poker games and raiding 
bars suspected of serving alcohol to under-age 
drinkers). So there are now far more SWAT teams, 
they are more heavily armed, and they are used far 
more frequently.  
This militarization of police forces in the USA has 
resulted in a number of unwanted consequences. One 
of them is over-spending on equipment; a recent article 
in The Economist gave the example of Fargo, North 
Dakota, where the police force now has an armoured 
personnel carrier, even though the city averages less 
than two homides a year. The more fundamental 
paradox, however, is that levels of violent crime have 
been falling in most US cities for several decades, so 
the militarization of policing is no longer related to the 
level of threat, and has actually made many citizens 
less safe than they were before, as more aggressive 
tactics are now routinely used by many police forces. 
As the same article in The Economist also reports, a 
number of minor confrontations have rapidly escalated 
to the unnecessary use of lethal force by paramilitary 
police officers. So measures originally taken to protect 
citizens can now result in an increased threat. 
The extension of security and surveillance also 
represents an attempt to increase knowledge and 
control of the situation. There has been an enormous 
investment in security and surveillance systems since 
9/11, but the same event also changed the context of 
security. In medieval Europe, for example, walls 
protected cities, and travelers were at risk while in 
transit. Today, the enemy can be anywhere, including 
inside the city, which raises new challenges for those 
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who must monitor the movement of terrorists and 
criminals while still allowing the free passage of those 
on legitimate business or leisure pursuits. Bauman 
(2013) suggests that the state has conceded some 
power to protect their citizens because of the 
importance of travel and trade, and also that the 
modern state is now obliged to provide solutions for 
problems created elsewhere. The security forces in the 
UK, for example, must now deal with radicalized 
young Muslims born in the UK, but who identify with 
ideological struggles in countries such as Syria. The 
technologies of security and surveillance have 
developed partly to address these more complex and 
fluid problems, but also partly in order to offer citizens 
an apparent (but usually only temporary) solution. 
Situating risk 
Risk usually implies a situation of potential danger, 
which is partly (as shown above) socially defined. The 
risk is not „real‟, as it has not happened yet; it is a 
possible future condition. For example, earthquakes are 
far more likely to happen in seismically active areas, 
but their timing cannot usually be predicted with 
precision. If one does not expect an earthquake for 
another century, it is quite rational to build a house in 
the area, but if one believes that an earthquake is 
imminent, it would be more rational to move away. 
Similarly, New Orleans was devastated by Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, and many of the former inhabitants 
still want to return there. The decision to return to New 
Orleans depends, in part, on an assessment of the 
future, i.e. on whether one expects another hurricane to 
happen in a relatively short time. When the event 
actually happens, of course, „risk‟ is replaced by reality 
(Douglas & Wildavski, 1983; Douglas, 1992). This is 
the way that insurance policies work; insurance cannot 
be bought after the disaster has happened. 
Risks are the combination of two factors; the chance 
that a particular event will happen to a person (or a 
business, or a country), and the number of times (or the 
length of time) that the person is exposed to that risk. 
If, for example, there is a 1/1000 chance of a person 
being hit by a car when crossing a busy road, that 
might seem like an acceptably low risk. However, if 
10,000 people cross the same road every day, then, on 
average, 10 people will be hit by a car every day. 
Similarly, if there is a 1/300 risk of a serious accident 
at a nuclear power plant in any given year, then that 
might be expressed as one serious accident, on 
average, every 300 years. That might seem like an 
acceptably low risk. If, however, there are 300 nuclear 
power stations in the world, then, on average, there 
will be one serious accident every year. So it is 
important to take both risk and exposure into account.  
Similarly, when a risk is expressed as a „one in a 
hundred year event‟, many people assume that that 
means that the event will not happen for a century – or, 
if it does happen, that it won‟t happen again for a 
hundred years. Neither of these interpretations is 
correct; a „one in a hundred year event‟ means that 
each year there is a 1% chance that the event will 
happen.[1] So it is just as likely to happen in year 1 as 
in any other year. It is also important to note that the 
probability remains the same, even when the event 
happens. For example, if the event actually happens in 
year 5, then the probability of it happening again in 
year 6 is still 1%.[2] 
The perception of risk is not necessarily the same as 
statistical risk; it tends to vary by context and between 
individuals. In a country with a high homicide rate, 
personal safety should be a matter of concern to all 
citizens. However, most people take threats more 
seriously when they believe themselves or their 
families to be directly exposed to the risk, so will 
effectively assign a lower value to a stranger being 
murdered further away. The killing of a friend, 
relative, acquaintance or neighbour is far more directly 
and personally threatening. In almost every country 
with high levels of violent crime, the violence is 
usually concentrated in particular areas, so that 
perpetrators are also likely to be victims. This means 
that the majority of the population is more concerned, 
in practice, with the distribution of the homicides than 
with the total; people living in areas with relatively low 
levels of violence may not feel that they are exposed to 
undue personal risk. 
Some of the most serious risks, however, are beyond 
the control not just of individuals, but of any one 
nation. For example, some of the significant sources of 
global risk today are located in under-developing, 
rogue and failed states, including conflicts based on 
religious fundamentalism, political and narco-
terrorism, and international crime (including money-
laundering, cybercrime and the trafficking of people, 
weapons and narcotics), and the increasing flows of 
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1 Risks are usually expressed as percentages, or on a scale 
of zero (impossible) to one (certain). So an extremely 
low risk has a probability close to zero, while a threat 
that is already present would have a probability of 1, or 
100%. 
2 This is true unless the event actually does make it less 
likely to happen again. For example, an earthquake 
might relieve the strain on a fault, so that the chance of 
another earthquake is then lower than before.  
  
political, economic and environmental migrants and 
refugees. Other risks include increasing antibiotic 
resistance in the bacteria that cause some of the major 
diseases, and the rapid international transmission of 
highly infectious diseases via main transport routes. 
These problems cannot be contained in their countries 
and regions of origin, and therefore now have global 
consequences. 
These are real threats. However, their impact on the 
public can be compounded by rapid global reporting of 
threats, attacks, natural disasters and major accidents, 
missing aircraft and other calamities, which can give a 
false sense of their prevalence, as any sufficiently 
shocking event caused by factors that are beyond one‟s 
personal control can result in a sense of powerlessness 
and risk. 
So, part of the public‟s sense of risk is irrational, in that 
natural disasters have occurred before and will 
continue to occur in future, so the only change is that 
they are now almost certain to be reported. The actual 
exposure to risk has not increased. However, part of 
the perception of increased risk is justified. Some 
developments, such as climate change or conflicts over 
resources or ideologies, could indeed make the world a 
more dangerous place, with consequences impacting 
on lives far from the original source. 
The politics of risk 
Durodié (retrieved 2014), in an analysis of the threat to 
the West posed by al-Qaeda, points out that the number 
of terrorist incidents has been going down, that most of 
them now are not in the West, but in places such as 
Kashmir, and that the threat to citizens in Europe today 
is minute compared to the second world war, when 
millions died. For example, the 7/7 bombings in 
London on the 7 July 2005 killed 52 civilians and 
injured over 700 more, which was the UK‟s worst 
terrorist incident since the 1988 Lockerbie bombing. 
By contrast, there were over 600,000 people killed in 
the UK in 1937 as a result of bombing by the 
Luftwaffe.  
This suggests that part of the reaction to terrorism is 
mediated by the perception of threat, which can be 
easily exaggerated by the media. This can also be 
exaggerated for political purposes; Durodié points out 
that polititical or religious leaders can then offer to 
restore stability and safety, sometimes using that to 
gain power. The danger here, of course, is that they can 
then direct people‟s fear at identifiable enemies, who 
may be a different ethnic or religious group, and some 
of the most horrific civil wars and genocides have 
stemmed from the identification of one group as the 
enemy, as people will then go and slaughter their 
former neighbours in order to remove the „threat‟. 
One way in which the media can play a role in 
magnifying the sense of threat is simply in reporting 
what is considered newsworthy. Reports of terrorist 
incidents are usually given far more prominence than 
reports of bad diets, even though bad diets actually kill 
far more people. Few people understand probability, or 
their exposure to a given risk, and so will over-react to 
events that appear to be uncontrollable (such as a 
random attack), and under-react to events that seem 
mundane and under their personal control (such as the 
consumption of cigarettes, sugar and cheeseburgers). 
This cognitive bias means that perception is not usually 
a good basis for important national decisions. As 
Sunstein (2002) points out, states should not echo the 
claims of their citizenry. Whenever alternatives are not 
properly evaluated by experts, unwise policies may 
actually engender new risks. 
More generally, the role of the state in identifying risk 
and developing strategies to manage risk is now one of 
the factors that define particular nations and cultures. 
For example, Beck (2006) argues that some of the core 
institutions (such as educational, political and 
economic structures) that regulated social life are now 
in decline. Banks are no longer pillars of respectability 
and stability; politics is about expediency and 
management rather than ideology; online educational 
systems are replacing teachers. Risk, however, has 
become a common mediator (like money) that 
connects people. Beck suggests that without the need 
to manage risk, societies would disintegrate, while 
Giddens (1991) argues that even the concept of the 
future is inextricably intertwined with concepts of risk. 
This idea is supported by Douglas & Aaron Wildawsky 
(1983), who argue that risks have to be considered, at 
least in part, as cultural legacies, which suggests that 
one of the more important defining features of each 
society is their beliefs and fears. The recent Russian 
annexation of the Crimea, for example, 
incomprehensible behaviour to European governments, 
makes more sense when the resentments and fears of 
the current Russian elite are taken into account. 
Similarly, the low demand for travel insurance in 
Argentina, in comparison to the USA, reflects not just 
different risk profiles but also a different cultural 
understanding and acceptance of particular types of 
risk. As the 9/11 example above indicated, Americans 
feel safer when they are in control of the vehicle, even 
when the opposite is true. 
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In conclusion, although almost all authors on the 
subject of risk agree on the need to take cultural and 
behavioural factors into account, it is important to 
develop a more systematic methodology and typology 
for assessing and categorizing the influence of cultural 
variables on attitudes to risk and the associated patterns 
of behaviour. 
The role of media 
The media and cultural industries have always played 
an important role in shaping the public reaction to 
threats.  
The shock many US citizens felt at the events of 
9/11 led to a national debate about what it 
means to be American individually, nationally 
and internationally, and the terms of this debate 
were primarily moral. For US citizens, this 
debate was not just about what we ought to do 
in response to 9/11, it was about how our 
responses to 9/11 morally configure us (Weber, 
2006: 4). 
Wars create a moral narrative about good and evil. The 
media tend to focus on a few significant aspects 
including who we are and who we are not (i.e. defining 
„us‟ and „them‟), and what we might become (i.e. what 
we have to do in response to an attack). For example, 
Korstanje and Olsen (2011) argue that the media 
shapes an ideological discourse which demonizes some 
people while over-valorizing others. Some acts of 
heroism may also be misappropriated. For example, the 
film U-571 (released in 2000) showed a German 
submarine being boarded in 1942 by United States 
Navy submariners in order to capture an Enigma cipher 
machine. In fact, it was British personnel from HMS 
Bulldog who first captured a naval Enigma machine 
from German submarine U-110 in the North Atlantic in 
May 1941, months before the United States had even 
entered the war. So an act of genuine heroism by 
British sailors was appropriated and used to show an 
apparent act of American heroism, which supports a 
commonly used narrative of the need for American 
intervention to save others. 
Risk and the Implications for Tourism 
The psychological impact of the 9/11 event affected 
tourism flows around the world. The 9/11 incident had 
such an extensive impact partly because the terrorists 
used hijacked aircraft, so that all forms of air travel 
were suddenly perceived to be much more dangerous. 
Some countries lost over 20% of their tourism arrivals, 
but others gained as tourists switched to destinations 
that were perceived to be safer, as terrorism has a 
particularly significant effect on the way that tourists 
perceive the relative safety of destinations (Peattie, 
Clarke & Peattie, 2005). 
The 9/11 incident also demonstrated a new-found 
ability to use media to amplify the effects of a 
„spectacular‟ attack; the targets and the timing were all 
chosen to ensure that the message would be seen 
around the world. Both the media impact and the 
creation of „winners‟ and „losers‟ in the economically-
vital tourism industry served to create fear and 
division. As this suggests, although the tourism and 
hospitality industry have devoted considerable effort to 
mitigate negative threats so that their destinations are 
not affected, the way that the media portray a crisis or 
a disaster will undoubtedly impact the local economy. 
A murder that is reported as an isolated event, for 
example, is unlikely to have a significant economic 
effect on a destination, but a murder that is portrayed 
as part of a pattern in which visitors are targeted 
probably will. 
Who is at risk? 
Korstanje (2009) argues that tourist risk is almost 
always defined in terms of those aspects which may 
jeopardize the well-being of tourists, based on the idea 
that vulnerability and a lack of familiarity make 
tourists easy prey for crime and terrorist attacks, and 
the idea that the tourism-dependent economies rely 
heavily on their image as destinations, and so are more 
vulnerable to the repercussions of attacks (Korstanje, 
2010 and 2011). 
It is true, of course, that tourists can be more at risk 
than locals, mainly because they are unfamiliar with 
the local terrain and customs, and may be instantly 
recognizeable as both strangers and relatively wealthy 
potential targets (See Figure 2). The Bali nightclub 
bombing in 2003, for example, was used to create fear 
and anger in the victims‟ countries of origin, and also 
to undermine the local citizenry‟s trust in the state. 
West (2008) notes that this event is usually portrayed 
in Australia as an archetypical act of terrorism 
comparable with the 9/11 event. 
The media narrative of terrorist incidents of this kind 
typically emphasizes that foreign tourists were 
targeted. This may be true of the specific incident, but 
can still give a very misleading impression, as the great 
majority of victims of Jihadist terrorists, for example, 
are actually Muslims living in the countries where the 
terrorists are active. 
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Some destinations actually combine risk aversion with 
risk attraction factors. As Lepp and Gibson (2008) put 
it, the industry is circumscribed by two contrasting 
tendencies, the sensation- or novelty-seeking risk, and 
risk aversion, so the personality of tourists plays a 
crucial role determining the perception of risk. Tourism 
involves a tension between security and curiosity (the 
wish to explore and find new experiences) (George, 
Inbakaran & Poyyamoli, 2010). Naturally, individuals 
vary in terms of their tolerance for risk (Dolnicar, 
2005), but some will seek out riskier experiences and 
destinations. 
Tourism Risk Model 
Internal tourism risks are here defined as any threat or 
danger generated by the functioning of the tourism 
industry itself, while external risks are those imposed 
from outside the industry. Internal risks can be further 
subdivided into: 
Risk associated with the service. 
Risks to the security of the tourist. 
The former includes relatively mundane factors, such 
as delayed flights, booking errors, lost luggage and so 
on. The latter is far more serious, with potential 
implications for lives, the image of the mode of 
transport (in the case of a hijacking or bombing at an 
airport) or tourist destination, and even the entire 
tourist system. This category includes: 
Virus outbreaks, pandemics. 
Terrorist attacks, especially those against civilians. 
Serious mass poisonings associated with 
contaminated food or water. 
Major road, rail or aircraft accidents. 
Large-scale natural and other disasters 
Frequent incidents of murder, rape, assaults, thefts. 
Violent political conflict, civil unrest. 
As noted earlier, any model to identify and manage risk 
in the tourism sector has to take into account two 
variables: 
The actual probability of a dangerous event. 
The psychological effect on the public. 
Efficient risk management plans have to address both 
the real risk, and also the public perception of the risk. 
The latter may be inaccurate, but failure to address it 
and give the public the necessary reassurance may 
result in the destination incurring serious economic 
costs as people could still take their business 
elsewhere. In this regard, three factors are particularly 
important: 
The extent of control 
The probability of repetition 
The status of victims. 
The extent of control refers to the actual and perceived 
effectiveness of the intelligence and security 
professionals, and their ability to anticipate and 
prevent attacks. 
The probability of repetition refers to the probability 
that the event will recur (i.e. if the ability to plan 
effectively and mobilize resources to increase 
resilience to further traumatic events is clearly 
lacking). 
The status of victims and their nationality will have a 
significant effect on the extent of the social/media 
impact of an event. For example, the murder of an 
American tourist in Mexico will typically get far 
more coverage in the USA than the murder of a 
Mexican. In terms of media coverage, therefore, 
one American may be „worth‟ thousands of local 
people, whose deaths are usually reported as 
statistics, rather than individual cases. Similarly, the 
killing of children, pregnant women or disabled 
people usually provokes a much stronger emotional 
response. Terrorists know this, of course, and so 
may attack tourists specifically in order to get more 
media coverage in the tourist‟s home nation and 
therefore inflict more economic damage. The 
degree of economic dependency on tourism in 
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Figure 2 – Coffin of French Tourist Assassinated 
in Argentina  
http://www.lapatilla.com/site/2011/08/05/las-mejores-fotos-del
-jueves-4-de-agosto/the-coffin-of-murdered-french-tourist-
cassandre-bouvier-is-loaded-into-an-undertakers-vehicle-in-
salta/ 
  
developing countries is therefore an important 
factor when trying to predict where tourists might 
be the targets for terrorist violence. 
These factors can be arrayed as outlined in Table 1. 
Paradoxically, when there is a high probability 
of repetition, the impact may actually reduce over time 
as the audience becomes inured to the event and its 
original impact gradually fades. 
Any incident that is overwhelming in scale (such as the 
Asian tsunami) or a deliberate atrocity (such as an act 
of terrorism) invokes fears of powerlessness, especially 
when nation states appear unable to prevent these 
events, respond to them appropriately or reduce the 
likelihood of their recurrence. This will tend to 
maximise the social and media impact. If the state is 
able to act decisively, and can give – and guarantee – 
the necessary reassurances – then the fear will usually 
be mitigated. Current risk perception research is mostly 
limited to the impact on tourists, which means that the 
explanations are typically partial and largely 
descriptive. In order to advance our understanding of 
the options for risk management, it is important to take 
into account both actual risks and reactions to risk, the 
impact on both locals and non-locals, and both the 
event and the role that the media play in portraying the 
event.  
Conclusion 
This paper argues that risk assessment and 
management has to include both actual risks and the 
psychological and cultural factors involved in 
mediating the perception, understanding and response 
to risk. Three factors are of particular importance when 
assessing the effects of risks on human behaviour; the 
extent of control, the probability of repetition and the 
status of the victims. With regard to the application to 
tourism, this model indicates that the long-term 
resilience and success of a tourist destination depends 
on (a) the exposure to risk, (b) the perception of risk 
and (c) the ability to manage both (a) and (b). Some 
destinations are more likely to be severely impacted by 
adverse events because they do not give sufficient 
attention to the need to both control risks and manage 
the perception of risk. In some cases, latent threats are 
ignored or trivialized, or external perspectives of risk 
rejected as intrusive or unfair, which can lead to 
disaster when threats eventually become real. In an era 
when events are rapidly reported around the world, 
causing a cascade of consequences, all policy-makers 
must understand the importance of creating 
comprehensive risk-management plans.  
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Table 1 : Risks to the Security of the Tourist 
Risk type Control 
Probability of 
Repetition 
Victims Impact 
Virus outbreak 
Low in vulnerable 
countries 
Low in the most 
vulnerable countries 
Anyone exposed, so 
depends on vector. 
High 
Terrorism 
Low in vulnerable 
countries 
High 
Locals and/or tourists 
may be the primary 
target 
High 
Contaminated Food 
Moderate to high, 
depending on the 
quality of control 
Low in countries that 
respond 
appropriately, high in 
countries that don’t 
Typically tourists 
Low to moderate, 
depending on 
numbers affected and 
reportage 
Accidents 
Moderate to high, 
depending on the 
quality of control 
Low in countries that 
respond 
appropriately, high in 
countries that don’t 
Anyone in the affected 
area, more likely to be 
local in the case of e.g. 
industrial accidents 
Low, typically short-
term 
Natural Disasters Low 
High, but periodicity 
may be low 
Anyone in the area 
High for severe 
disasters 
Theft 
Low in the most 
vulnerable countries 
High 
Locals and tourists; 
tourists may be 
targeted 
Low, unless common 
and/or accompanied 
by violence 
Homicide 
Low in the most 
vulnerable countries 
High Locals and tourists 
High, if frequent and/
or tourists targeted 
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